Shame and Moral Contamination in Early Confucian Philosophy
Jing Iris Hu, Concordia University Montreal
Relative lack of philosophical discussion of external social factors has led to theoretical ambiguities regarding the concept of shame, and to disregard of systemic patterns of socially induced shame. Vulnerability to shame prompted by external social factors should be understood as natural signs of our sociality and communal affiliation, I point out. On the conceptual level, I argue, shame and stigma should be clearly defined and decoupled so as to avoid misattributing features of stigma to shame. Inspired by the Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s work, I discuss two types of shame—in Xunzi’s terms, “shame that comes from the circumstances” and “shame that comes from inner dispositions”--to help us differentiate between shame caused by social situations, such as being insulted or slighted, and shame that arises primarily from an inner sense of moral failure. This distinction, I argue, helps us understand our vulnerability to shame-causing circumstances as a common condition, leading the way to a more nuanced discussion of when shame can be constructive and when it is not. It is only after looking carefully at social triggers of shame, such as stigmatization, that we can appreciate the moral potential of shame when it is not due to harmful triggers.